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UNCERTAINTY FROM ABROAD: ROME II 
AND THE CHOICE OF LAW FOR 
DEFAMATION CLAIMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he ease with which communication travels across borders via the 
Internet has caused defamation law1 to become an area of great 
public concern. Under the conventional publishing model, distribution of 
print copies into a given forum creates a clear and measurable jurisdic-
tional limit for defamation claims.2 A publisher traditionally has control 
over extraterritorial jurisdiction by choosing where and where not to dis-
tribute print copies.3 However, when a publisher posts an article on the 
Internet, it becomes instantly accessible to over a billion readers across 
                                                                                                             
 1. Defamation is an intentional tort that generally arises when a communication 
harms the reputation of another as to lower her in the estimation of the community or to 
deter third persons from associating or dealing with her. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
559 (1977). Defamation encompasses both the torts of libel and slander: 
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed 
words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communi-
cation that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or 
printed words. 
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, 
transitory gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in 
Subsection (1). 
Id. § 568. In many jurisdictions, the determination of whether a claim amounts to libel or 
slander will dictate the evidence of damages, but the Internet has collapsed distinctions 
between the torts. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Characteristics Making Internet Com-
munication Challenge Traditional Models of Regulation: What Every International Jurist 
Should Know About the Internet, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 39, 60–61 (2005). For the 
sake of avoiding confusion, this Note refers broadly to “defamation” rather than the more 
precise terminology of “libel” or “slander” when discussing claims against publishers and 
others. Many commentators also treat these terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Judge 
Robert D. Sack, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2.1, 
n.3 (2004) [hereinafter SACK ON DEFAMATION]. 
 2. From a U.S. perspective, for instance, the key question is whether a publisher has 
availed itself of a given state’s laws. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984) (holding 
that California had jurisdiction over a defamation claim against a Florida corporation that 
had availed itself of California law by distributing 600,000 copies of a weekly newspaper 
to California). 
 3. See, e.g., Chaiken v. VV Pub. Corp. 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that jurisdiction in Massachusetts was improper for a defamation claim against a New 
York publisher because the publisher had distributed less than 200 copies of a weekly 
newspaper into Massachusetts). 
T 
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the world.4 While print newspapers face increasingly lower circulations, 
online publishing has become an effective means for publishers to attract 
readership.5 Although this shift from print to online publishing might 
strengthen the long-term viability of the newspaper industry, it also has 
far-reaching effects. Like many other areas of law,6 commentators have 
repeatedly noted that the Internet has wreaked havoc on the jurisdictional 
and choice-of-law aspects of international defamation claims.7 
Much of this difficulty stems from substantive differences in national 
approaches to defamation law and the ease with which plaintiffs can 
bring their claims in foreign jurisdictions. Central to these differences is 
                                                                                                             
 4. Over sixteen percent of the world’s population currently uses the Internet, with 
developing regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America experiencing the 
most rapid growth. World Internet Usage Statistics and Population Stats, 
http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
 5. Katharine Q. Seelye, Newspaper Circulation Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2006, at C1. See also Annys Shin, Newspaper Circulation Continues to Decline; Internet, 
Cable Cited as Competition, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at E3 (noting that circulation of 
print publications has declined over the past twenty years). At least one major news pub-
lisher is prepared for Internet publishing to continue to expand and likely one day sup-
plant print publishing. Murdoch Reaffirms New [sic] Corp.’s Internet Policy, TIMES 
ONLINE (London), Nov. 24, 2005, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,, 
9071-1889201,00.html. 
 6. Dean Symeonides notes the following prescient observation by the Illinois Su-
preme Court about the impact of technological innovation on jurisdictional issues: 
Advanced means of distribution and other commercial activity have made pos-
sible these modern methods of doing business, and have largely effaced the 
economic significance of State lines. By the same token, today’s facilities for 
transportation and communication have removed much of the difficulty and in-
convenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits brought in other 
States. 
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by techno-
logical and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have been 
reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, and injus-
tice rather than justice is promoted. 
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961) 
(cited in SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES et. al., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, 
INTERNATIONAL 21 (2d ed. 2003)). 
 7. See James R. Pielemeier, Choice of Law for Multistate Defamation: The State of 
Affairs as Internet Defamation Beckons, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 55–57 (2003); Allan R. 
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of 
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 411–12 (2004); Heather Maly, Note & 
Comment, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum Shopping Trends in 
Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 883 (2006). 
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the fact that, compared to the United States,8 many countries “place 
much greater importance on the protection of personal reputation, dig-
nity, and honor than they do on protecting the freedom of speech.”9 
While U.S. defamation law reflects the constitutional guarantees of free-
dom of speech and press10 under New York Times v. Sullivan11 and its 
progeny, Sullivan’s impact abroad has been mixed.12 Instead, every 
country possesses a different legal standard for resolving defamation 
claims based on their particular histories, values, and political systems.13 
For instance, while the United States and the United Kingdom share the 
same tradition of common-law defamation, both countries have devel-
                                                                                                             
 8. In the United States, modern protection of the press derives from N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 
767, 776 (1986) (“To ensure that true speech about matters of public concern is not de-
terred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot 
stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public con-
cern.”). 
 9. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Defamation in the Digital Age: Some Comparative 
Law Observations on the Difficulty in Resolving Free Speech and Reputation in the 
Emerging Global Village, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 343–45 (2005). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
 11. 376 U.S. 254. 
 12. Kyu Ho Youm, New York Times v. Sullivan: Impact on Freedom of Press 
Abroad, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Fall 2004, at 12. 
 13. For instance, one publisher argued that British defamation law differs from U.S. 
law because: 
(1) the burden of proving truth of defamatory statements falls on the defendant; 
(2) defamation is a strict liability tort and plaintiff need not prove that the de-
fendant acted with any fault, in contrast with the “actual malice” standard that 
applies under American First Amendment principles; (3) protection for expres-
sion of opinion is severely limited; (4) only limited protection is available for 
statements about public officials or public figures; (5) aggravated damages are 
permitted for asserting certain defenses, for example, a defendant’s seeking to 
justify the publication; (6) plaintiff’s attorneys fees and costs must be paid by 
the unsuccessful defendant; (7) multiple, repetitive suits are allowed for each 
individual publication, for example, for different media or various places of 
publication. 
Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See 
also Libel Act, 1843, c. 96, § 6 n.3 (U.K.). For further analysis of English defamation 
law, see Douglas W. Vick & Linda MacPherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the 
European Union, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 939–49 (1996). Just prior to this Note’s publica-
tion, the English House of Lords handed down a stunning decision that should have far-
reaching implications for English defamation law, specifically as to whether publications 
should receive a qualified privilege for reporting on issues of public interest. Jameel v. 
Wall St. J., [2006] U.K.H.L. 44, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 
200506/ldjudgmt/jd061011/jamee.pdf. 
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oped divergent approaches to balancing free speech and reputation inter-
ests.14 This conflict-of-laws problem is exacerbated by the fact that for-
eign courts appear keen to adjudicate claims against U.S. publishers 
without regard for the free-press protections under U.S. law.15 As a re-
sult, publishers are now subject to new and unforeseen liabilities16 and 
are likely to begin constructing “virtual borders” around their Internet 
presence to avoid exposure to restrictive foreign defamation laws.17 
In assessing the current situation, one British government commentator 
noted that any substantive solution to the difficulty of international 
defamation law would come in the realm of international treaty accom-
panied by greater harmonization of substantive national laws.18 One such 
pending treaty that will perhaps19 encompass the problematic arena of 
international defamation law is “The law applicable to non-contractual 
                                                                                                             
 14. Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett, International and Comparative Perspec-
tives on Defamation, Free Speech, and Privacy: Defamation, Free Speech, and Privacy, 
50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 78–80 (2005). 
 15. See Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1329 (holding that jurisdiction in Eng-
land was permissible for comments published on two websites even though all relevant 
events occurred in the United States). See also Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 
C.L.R. 575 (Austl.) (holding that a plaintiff could successfully bring a claim under Aus-
tralian defamation law against a United States publisher whose only contact with Austra-
lia was Internet publication); Eric Barendt, Jurisdiction in Internet Libel Cases, 110 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 727, 737 (2006) (arguing that weighing American First Amendment rights in 
international defamation claims “confers on United States courts a decisive voice on the 
balancing of reputation and free speech rights”). 
 16. See Michael F. Sutton, Note, Legislating the Tower of Babel: International Re-
strictions on Internet Content and the Marketplace of Ideas, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 417, 
419–28 (2004). 
 17. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders On, or Borders Around—The Future of the 
Internet, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 343, 351–52 (2006). 
 18. THE LAW COMMISSION (U.K.), SCOPING STUDY NO. 2, DEFAMATION AND THE 
INTERNET: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 39 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://news.baou.com/documents/pdf/defamation2.pdf [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION 
SCOPING STUDY NO. 2]. 
The law [of jurisdiction for Internet-based defamation claims] has always been 
complex, and attempts within the EU to create greater legal certainty have 
added new ambiguities. There are no easy answers . . . . Although we have 
some sympathy with the concerns expressed about “unacceptable levels of 
global risks,” any solution would require an international treaty, accompanied 
by greater harmonisation of the substantive law of defamation. 
Id. 
 19. In early 2006 the European Commission excised the defamation provision from 
Rome II, rendering the status of the convention uncertain. Infra Part III. 
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obligations,”20 known commonly as “Rome II.”21 This agreement among 
the European Union’s Member States will determine the choice of law 
for cross-border defamation claims22 as well as a variety of other cross-
border claims based in non-contractual relationships.23 Rome II will de-
termine which law is applicable to all defamation claims brought within 
a Member State’s forum,24 although jurisdiction will continue to be 
available in any nation where a publication is read.25 As such, Rome II 
presents an opportunity for an international body of lawmakers to adopt a 
clearer and fairer standard of how to settle defamation claims against 
foreign publishers in the Internet age.26 
                                                                                                             
 20. EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2003) 427, European Parliament First Reading Draft 
(July 6, 2005), available at http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/pages/rome2.html (follow 
“Read the Rome II report (provisional)” hyperlink) [hereinafter Rome II (European Par-
liament draft)]. Article 6 of Rome II encompasses the choice of law for defamation 
claims. EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2003) 427, European Commission Draft 17-18 (July 22, 
2003), available at http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/pages/rome2.html (follow “Com-
mission’s proposal [COM (2003) 0427]” hyperlink) [hereinafter Rome II (European 
Commission 2003 draft)]. 
 21. The name “Rome II” comes from the fact that the agreement expands upon the 
1980 Rome Convention, or Rome I, which created choice-of-law rules for contractual 
claims. Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, June 19, 1980, 1980 
O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome I]. In contrast, Rome II applies to non-contractual 
claims. Rome II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20, art. 1. In December 2005, 
the European Commission put forth a proposal to “modernize” some of Rome I’s rules, 
although the Commission noted that the convention is “widely appreciated by relevant 
circles” and would not be substantially modified. European Commission, Rome I Pro-
posal (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refe 
rence=MEMO/05/483. See also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 
650 final (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/ 
com/2005/com2005_0650en01.pdf. 
 22. Rome II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20, art. 6. 
 23. Rome II will determine the choice of law for non-contractual claims, including 
such diverse subject matter as breaches of data-protection rights, id. recital 14; unjust 
enrichment claims, id. art. 9(a); automobile accidents, id. art. 3; as well as intellectual 
property claims. Id. recital 14. For an analysis of the potential impact of Rome II on intel-
lectual property conflicts, see Annette Kur, Applicable Law: An Alternative Proposal for 
International Regulation—The Max-Planck Project on International Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 951, 959–61 (2005). 
 24. Rome II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20, art. 6. 
 25. However, the border between jurisdiction and choice of law as it relates to Rome 
II is “nebulous.”  Christopher J. Kunke, Comment, Rome II and Defamation: Will the 
Tail Wag the Dog?, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1733, 1743 n.79 (2005). Indeed, once estab-
lishing that jurisdiction is proper, many courts do not reach the secondary issue of choice 
of law. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. Unsurprisingly, publishing groups have lobbied intensely for a clearer rule during 
the drafting process of Rome II. See, e.g., International Federation of Journalists, Euro-
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Yet, despite the possibility of creating a clearer choice-of-law standard, 
Rome II’s defamation provision proved to be extremely difficult to re-
solve. In 2006, after over three years of work, the European Union found 
itself no closer to creating a rule that all members could agree upon. The 
European Commission27 eventually excised the defamation provision 
from Rome II, effectively forestalling a new framework for the choice of 
law for defamation claims within the European Union’s Member 
States.28 
Despite this setback, much can still be learned from Rome II, both in 
terms of its potential application as well as the issues raised and debated 
during the drafting process—issues that are emblematic of the broader 
complexities of defamation law in the Internet age. This Note will argue 
that the European Commission’s parliamentary maneuver is by no means 
the end of the story, but rather it is one chapter in a slow, difficult strug-
gle to achieve a workable solution that satisfies publishers, national 
courts, and defamation plaintiffs. Part II of this Note examines the exist-
ing choice-of-law and jurisdictional rules for resolving defamation 
claims in Europe, the United States, and in other nations. Part III traces 
Rome II’s legislative history, focusing on the opposing place-of-harm 
and place-of-publication approaches to defamation claims. Part IV exam-
ines Rome II through the lens of the modern American approach to con-
flicts of law. This Note concludes that while the drafters of Rome II at-
tempted to create a rule to protect publishers, their inability to success-
fully adopt such a provision reflects the intractability of balancing pub-
lishing and reputational interests. This Note will argue that American 
conflicts law provides key insights into both the policy behind protecting 
press interests and also how to create a more workable choice-of-law 
framework. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ADDRESSING CHOICE OF LAW AND 
JURISDICTION IN DEFAMATION CLAIMS 
While Rome II is a choice-of-law provision, the distinction between 
choice-of-law and jurisdictional rules for defamation claims is notori-
ously murky. When a court holds that jurisdiction is proper, it usually 
determines not only the forum where a defamation claim will be heard, 
but also whether any legal protections a publisher possesses under its 
                                                                                                             
pean Journalists Call on Brussels to Drop New Legal Threat to Media (June 27, 2005), 
available at http://www.ifj.org/default.asp?Index=3206. 
 27. The European Commission and European Parliament have equal control over 
Rome II’s drafting through the European Union’s co-decision process. See infra note 156. 
 28. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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domestic law are available.29 Much of this may result from the fact that 
courts are reluctant to apply foreign laws when the outcome would be 
outright dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim.30 This scenario is especially 
common when a plaintiff brings a claim in an English court against a 
U.S. publisher, since many actions that would be dismissed under U.S. 
law due to a violation of the First Amendment would nevertheless be 
proper under English law.31 Courts regularly impose their domestic laws 
over foreign publishers even when the publisher’s contact with the forum 
is tenuous at best,32 a practice which has resulted in a confusing web of 
jurisdictions and defamation laws. 
The difficulty of applying defamation law in the Internet age is due in 
large part to the slippery definition of “publication.”33 The United States 
has adopted a “single publication rule,” which dictates that publication 
only occurs when a work is first distributed and also limits a defamation 
claim to a single action within one jurisdiction.34 The purpose of the sin-
gle publication rule is to protect defendants from harassment by multiple 
actions in separate jurisdictions, since a single action in any one jurisdic-
tion affords the plaintiff his day in court.35 In determining jurisdiction for 
cross-border defamation claims, many national courts, as well as the 
European Union, have rejected the single publication rule.36 The reason 
for rejecting such a rule is because it would theoretically deny plaintiffs 
the ability to seek an injunction in every forum where their reputation has 
been harmed.37 But, as a result of this flexibility, jurisdiction for a trans-
                                                                                                             
 29. See supra note 25. 
 30. See, e.g., Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1329. See also Stewart E. Sterk, 
The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PENN L. REV. 949, 998–99 
(1994) (noting the high burden that litigators face when they argue that choice-of-law 
principles should overcome a judge’s initial conclusion about who should win a lawsuit). 
 31. See infra Part II.C. 
 32. See infra Part II.B. 
 33. Traditionally, publication to a third party is one element of a successful defama-
tion claim. Hebditch v. MacIlwaine [1894] 2 Q.B. 54, 58; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 558(b) (1977). 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A. In a single suit, a claimant may re-
cover for all damages caused by the defamatory statement in all jurisdictions, whether 
domestic or foreign. Id. § 577A cmt. d. 
 35. Id. § 577A cmt. e. 
 36. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 601–05 (Austl.); 
Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [2001] Q.B. 1805; Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill 
v. Presse Alliance, 1995 E.C.R. I-415. 
 37. Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] E.M.L.R. 643, 653 (H.L.). 
[T]he single cause of action theory, if adopted by judicial decision in England, 
would disable a plaintiff from seeking an injunction in more than one jurisdic-
tion. In the context of the multiplicity of state jurisdictions in the United States 
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national defamation claim typically exists simultaneously and concur-
rently in any and all states where a publication is read.38 As some have 
argued, this has amounted to “universal jurisdiction” for any communica-
tion posted on the Internet.39 
As is often the danger in this scenario, the ease with which a plaintiff 
can bring a claim of defamation against an online publisher in a foreign 
jurisdiction has given rise to forum shopping.40 Some have argued that 
                                                                                                             
there is no doubt much good sense in the Uniform Single Publication Act. But 
the theory underpinning it cannot readily be transplanted to the consideration 
by English courts of trans-national publications. 
Id. 
 38. See Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12.33 (2006) (“A literal applica-
tion of the ‘place of the wrong’ rule leads to the bizarre result that a multistate publication 
of a defamatory statement gives rise to a separate tort in each state in which publication 
occurs, and is governed by the law of each such state.”). See also Edmund L. Andrews, 
Germany’s Efforts to Police Web Are Upsetting Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at 
A1; Kurt Wimmer, Comments of International Media Companies and Associations on 
Australian Defamation Law Reform 6 (Oct. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.cov.com/download/content/brochures/australiandefamationreform.pdf. Rejec-
tion of the single publication rule also eviscerates statutes of limitations, since “every 
download of an article from an archive would start the clock running again.”  Wimmer, 
supra, at 5. 
 39. Andrews, supra note 38. 
“The Internet created a universal jurisdiction, so that once you are on the Inter-
net you are subject to the laws of every country in the world,” said Chris 
Kuner, an American lawyer in Frankfurt who closely follows German cyber-
space issues. “The Internet gives rise to jurisdictional problems that never hap-
pened before.” 
Id. 
 40. Maryann McMahon, Defamation Claims in Europe: A Survey of the Legal Ar-
mory, 19 COMM. LAW 24, 24 (2002).  
It is becoming increasingly common for publishers based in the United States 
to find themselves on the receiving end of a defamation claim filed in Europe. 
England in particular has been a favorite forum for those aggrieved by an inter-
national publication because it historically has offered claimants friendly juries 
and a favorable burden of proof. Once a claimant has proved publication of a 
defamatory article in England, damage is assumed and the burden immediately 
shifts to the publisher, which must demonstrate that the defamatory statement is 
true or another substantive defense exists. 
Id. See also Matthew Fagin, Comment, Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology 
Vs. Values, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 395, 434 (2003). In contrast, most ju-
risdictions outside of England place the burden of proof on plaintiffs. See, e.g., Phila. 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986); Schwabe v. Austria, 242 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser.A) 23 (1993). 
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forum shopping is not problematic per se, in that it allows plaintiffs to 
find forums that are competent to adjudicate their claims and “drives out 
bad laws.”41 However, even under this view, so-called “parallel litiga-
tion” is clearly problematic since it creates a race to the court between 
plaintiffs and defendants seeking declaratory judgments and adds addi-
tional costs and burdens to lawsuits.42 Plaintiffs are likely to bring multi-
ple lawsuits on the same subject matter in different countries, and ac-
tively seek a jurisdiction where they are most assured of success.43 An-
other significant danger is that defamation claims are also likely to be 
brought against U.S. publishers under foreign laws that lack equivalent 
free-speech guarantees.44 Adding to the uncertainty, U.S. courts have at 
times refused to enforce foreign defamation judgments against domestic 
publishers due to this very lack of First Amendment protection.45 
A. The Fiona Shevill Case and European Approach to Choice of Law in 
Defamation Claims 
Central to the European Union’s46 movement towards a common mar-
ket is the harmonization of the laws of Member States in order to reduce 
the transaction costs of operating in foreign states.47 In 1968, Europe 
                                                                                                             
 41. Peter Nygh, The Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and For-
eign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS 
FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 281–82 (Patrick J. Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001). 
 42. Id. at 282. 
 43. See, e.g., Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1329 (holding for plaintiff in a 
defamation claim based on publication of comments on a California-based website, even 
though an identical claim did not survive under U.S. law). 
 44. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 614 (Austl.) (hold-
ing that jurisdiction against U.S. publisher was proper even though Australia does not 
possess First Amendment protections). 
 45. See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997). See also infra Part 
II.C. 
 46. Prior to 1993, with the adoption of the Treaty on European Union, the European 
Union was titled the European Economic Community. Europa, The EU at a Glance: 
Europe in 12 Lessons, Historic Steps, http://europa.eu.int/abc/12lessons/index2_en.htm 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006). To avoid confusion, this Note refers to the European Union 
to mean both the European Economic Community and the European Union as it stands 
today. 
 47. See T. Vogelaar, Director-General for the Internal Market and Approximation of 
Legislation at the Commission, Opening Address as Chairman of the Meeting of Gov-
ernment Experts (Feb. 26, 1969) excerpted in Prof. Mario Giuliano & Prof. Paul Lagarde, 
GIULIANO LAGARDE REPORT, 1980 J.O. (C 282) (“[T]here are still legal fields in which the 
differences between national legal systems and the lack of unified rules of conflict defi-
nitely impede the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital among the 
Member States.”) available at http://www.rome-convention.org/instruments/i_rep_lagard 
e_en.htm. The seeds of the European Union were first sown in 1951 with the Treaty of 
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reached its first choice-of-law agreement, informally titled the Brussels 
Convention.48 The Brussels Convention applied to disputes between citi-
zens of Member States based in both contract49 and tort.50 Today, juris-
diction in the European Union is governed by the “Regulation on juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters” (Brussels I Regulation).51 As with the Brussels 
Convention, defamation claims under the Brussels I Regulation can be 
brought wherever the harmful event occurred—in other words, wherever 
an allegedly defamatory communication is read.52 This rule reflects the 
European preference for bright-line jurisdictional rules as opposed to the 
American market-driven approach that focuses instead on the parties’ 
contacts with the forum.53 
In Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) interpreted the Brussels Convention rule 
and held that the “place where the harmful event occurred” must be un-
derstood to “acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to commence 
proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of 
the event giving rise to it.”54 Under Bier, European courts allow plaintiffs 
considerable freedom to bring a cause of action in any state where they 
                                                                                                             
Paris setting up the European Coal and Steel Community. Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. In 1957, the Treaty of 
Rome established the European Economic Community as a common market for goods 
and services. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, O.J. (C 325) 
44 (2002). Both the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome were initially signed by Bel-
gium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the European Economic 
Community, followed by Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. 
 48. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
 49. Id. art. 5. Choice of law for contractual claims is now governed by Rome I. Rome 
I, supra note 21. 
 50. Brussels Convention, supra note 48, art. 5. 
 51. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2000 O.J. 
(L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]. Additionally, enforcement of foreign claims 
within the European Union is governed by treaty. See Regulation (EC) creating a Euro-
pean Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, April 21, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15. 
 52. Brussels Convention, supra note 48, art. 5(3). See also Vick & MacPherson, su-
pra note 13, at 972 (noting that the drafters of the Brussels Convention deliberately cre-
ated an ambiguous choice-of-law rule). 
 53. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law for Europe 
and America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13, 25 n.60 (2005). 
 54. Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA, 
1976 E.C.R. I-1735, para. 19. The ECJ’s ruling was requested by the Gerechtshof of the 
Hague. Id. para. 1. 
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claim they were harmed.55 Rather than interpreting existing choice-of-
law conventions in a limited manner by focusing on the place where the 
act occurred, the ECJ interpreted the harmful “act” to have taken place 
wherever it is felt or perceived.56 According to Professors Vick and 
MacPherson, this approach enlarged the plaintiff’s choices and thus gives 
rise to forum-shopping.57 Even though European courts only permit a 
plaintiff to bring a defamation claim in forums where her reputation was 
actually harmed, under Bier’s permissive rule jurisdiction exists over a 
defamation claim wherever a publication was read.58 
Perhaps the most important and emblematic European decision relating 
to the choice of law for defamation claims is Fiona Shevill v. Presse Al-
liance SA, in which the ECJ specifically applied the reasoning of Bier to 
a defamation context.59 In 1989, the French newspaper France-Soir 
printed an article accusing an English student of money laundering.60 
Although the student was working in Paris at the time the alleged inci-
dent took place, she returned to her native England and brought a defa-
mation suit in the British High Court of England and Wales.61 The 
French newspaper disputed whether the British court had jurisdiction 
because, within the meaning of the Brussels Convention, “the place 
where the harmful event occurred”62 was France and “no harmful event 
had occurred in England.”63 The matter was referred to the ECJ,64 which 
                                                                                                             
 55. See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 973. 
 56. Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA, 1976 E.C.R. I-
1735, para. 24. 
 57. Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 973. 
 58. Id. at 985.  Professors Vick and MacPherson explain: 
The difficulties inherent in the Bier approach are exacerbated in the defamation 
context, though, by the confluence of three factors: the number of potential fo-
rums reached by internationally disseminated publications; the related growth 
in the number of persons with international reputations, at least within their 
fields of specialty, who can be harmed in multiple localities by a single news-
paper article; and the wild variation in defamation policies from member state 
to member state. 
Id. 
 59. Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance, 1995 E.C.R. I-415. See also Vick & MacPher-
son, supra note 13, at 975. 
 60. Fiona Shevill, 1995 E.C.R. I-415, paras. 3–8. 
 61. Id. para. 11. 
 62. Brussels Convention, supra note 48. 
 63. Fiona Shevill, 1995 E.C.R. I-415, para. 15. 
 64. Id. Both the High Court of England and Wales as well as the Court of Appeal 
ruled that jurisdiction was available to the plaintiff in England. Id. The defendant then 
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held that, under Bier, when a person has been defamed in two or more 
European Union states, the Brussels Convention allowed the plaintiff to 
bring a claim wherever her reputation was harmed and the plaintiff was 
not required to prove damages before bringing suit in a given forum.65 
Under the ECJ’s analysis, if the plaintiff sued in France, she could 
claim any and all damages caused to her reputation throughout the Euro-
pean Union.66 However, she could also elect to bring her claim in Eng-
land,67 but would be limited to only damages caused within England.68 
Thus, under Fiona Shevill, a defamation claim can be brought either in 
the country of publication or in any country where the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion was harmed, but the available remedy might be limited if the plain-
tiff elects the latter.69 Fiona Shevill also impacts the choice of law for 
defamation claims.70 The case has been interpreted to mean that if a 
                                                                                                             
appealed the decision to the House of Lords, which referred the case to the ECJ to deter-
mine the proper interpretation of the Brussels Convention. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. para. 25 (“The court of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publi-
cation is established must therefore have jurisdiction to hear the action for damages for 
all the harm caused by the unlawful act.”). 
 67.  Id. paras. 29–30. 
 In the case of an international libel through the press, the injury caused by a de-
famatory publication to the honour, reputation and good name of a natural or 
legal person occurs in the places where the publication is distributed, when the 
victim is known in those places. 
It follows that the courts of each Contracting State in which the defamatory 
publication was distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered in-
jury to his reputation have jurisdiction to rule on the injury caused in that State 
to the victim’ s reputation. 
Id. 
 68. States in which a publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have 
suffered injury to her reputation “have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm 
caused in the State of the court seised.”  Id. para. 33. 
 69. Id. paras. 49–57. 
 70.  The ECJ noted that the Brussels Convention only governed jurisdiction and that 
choice of law is a matter to be determined by national conflict-of-laws rules, provided 
that the effectiveness of the Brussels Convention is not impaired. Id. para. 36.  This stipu-
lation is misleading, however, because states rarely elect to apply foreign law to defama-
tion claims. Instead, choice of law usually attaches once a court determines that jurisdic-
tion is proper. See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 937–38. 
The irony of Shevill lies in its insistence that the Brussels Convention was not 
intended to impose substantive rules of law on the member states of the Euro-
pean Union, even though it is a paradigmatic example of how a matter of pro-
cedure can fundamentally shape the substantive direction of the law. 
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plaintiff brings a suit in a country where her reputation was harmed, then 
the law of that jurisdiction applies; but, if a plaintiff brings a suit for all 
damages in the state where the publication is based, then the court will 
apply foreign laws on a “distributive basis.”71 In practice, Fiona Shevill 
creates a flexible rule whereby courts can exercise jurisdiction and apply 
domestic law against foreign publishers as long as a citizen was harmed 
in some way in a given forum.72 At least compared to the American ap-
proach, this permits a plaintiff to have considerable discretion in choos-
ing where to bring a defamation claim.73 
There are numerous problems that occur when a plaintiff elects to sue 
in a forum other than the place of publication. Although courts limit 
damages to only harm caused within that forum,74 damages caused by 
defamation are inherently ephemeral.75 The deduction of damages under 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 71. European Commission 2003 draft, supra note 20, at 18. 
[I]f the victim decides to bring the action in a court in a State where the publi-
cation is distributed, that court will apply its own law to the damage sustained 
in that State. But if the victim brings the action in the court for the place where 
the publisher is headquartered, that court will have jurisdiction to rule on the 
entire claim for damages: the [law of the place of publication] will then govern 
the damage sustained in that country and the court will apply the laws involved 
on a distributive basis if the victim also claims compensation for damage sus-
tained in other States. 
Id.  See also Working Document on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, European 
Parliament 6–7 (Jan. 26, 2004), available at http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/resources 
/index/Rome+II (follow “Download this document” hyperlink under “Working Docu-
ment on Rome II [Part 1, Articles 1 to 8]” heading) [hereinafter Rome II (Working Docu-
ment)]. 
 72. See Hunter v. Gerald Duckworth & Co., [2000] I.L.Pr. 229 (Ir.) (holding that 
under Fiona Shevill jurisdiction in Ireland was proper for a defamation claim by an Irish 
citizen against an English publisher given that it “was almost inevitable that [the booklet 
in question] would be published in Ireland”); Skogvik v. Sveriges Television AB, [2003] 
I.L.Pr. 24 (Nor.) (holding that under Fiona Shevill jurisdiction in Norway was proper for 
a defamation claim against a Swedish television broadcast that was also received in Nor-
way). 
 73. Moritz Keller, Lessons for the Hague: Internet Jurisdiction in the Contract and 
Tort Cases in the European Community and the United States, 23 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 61 (Fall 2004). 
 74. Hunter v. Gerald Duckworth & Co., [2000] I.L.Pr. 229 (Ir.)  (“[T]hese proceed-
ings seek to recover damages only in respect of any loss of reputation suffered by the 
plaintiffs within the jurisdiction of this court.”). 
 75. See Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of 
Choice of Law for Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 279, 283 (2005). 
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Fiona Shevill is often rendered irrelevant because by merely establishing 
jurisdiction, a plaintiff has raised considerable leverage for a settle-
ment.76 Thus, Fiona Shevill’s limitation does not provide any substantive 
barrier to recovery for a defamation claim even when the contact be-
tween the publisher and a given European forum is minimal. Under the 
American view, protracted litigation has a chilling effect on First 
Amendment rights,77 which is entirely unmitigated by a reduction in 
damages. In other words, under Fiona Shevill, a plaintiff might only be 
compensated for a portion of her damages, yet she has still “won the 
war” by vindicating her rights and by putting the public on notice not to 
make similar statements.78 
Furthermore, in rejecting the single publication rule, Fiona Shevill per-
mits forum shopping and enables plaintiffs to bring harassment suits.79 
One justification for rejecting the single publication rule is that such a 
rule would prevent a plaintiff from enjoining a defendant in every juris-
diction where she is defamed.80 However, it is unclear why this is true, 
because courts regularly issue injunctions that are intended to have extra-
territorial reach.81 This belief also is inconsistent with the way that liti-
gants typically view defamation claims, which is to vindicate one’s repu-
tation and to receive compensation for the harm caused.82 Thus, without 
                                                                                                             
 76. See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 977–78. 
 77. See Couch v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 853 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 78. The following statement about the recent Jameel v. Wall Street Journal case, su-
pra note 13, shows that plaintiffs are often far more concerned with vindication of their 
reputation than recovery of damages: 
“Mr. Justice Eady and the Court of Appeal ruled that I was libeled” Jameel 
said. “The House of Lords ruled that I was not, because it was reasonable for 
The Wall Street Journal Europe to print something that was false. So be it. I 
was only ever interested in proving that the allegations were untrue.” 
Clare Dyer, Law Lords Give Media Shield Against Libel in Landmark Ruling, GUARDIAN 
(London), Oct. 12, 2006, at 7 (emphasis added). See also Sarah Lyall, High Court in 
Britian Loosens Strict Libel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A10. Furthermore, the 
Fiona Shevill rule also encourages potential litigants to move to countries with pro-
plaintiff defamation laws. See Dr. Nicolas Quoy, Enforcement of Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights in the European Union 19 (May 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.abgm.adalet.gov.tr/3-1-EN-Quoy.pdf. The facts of the Fiona Shevill case 
itself highlight this problem, in that the plaintiff returned to her native England to bring 
her defamation claim. 
 79. Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 985–88. 
 80. See supra note 37. 
 81. Oren Bigos, Jurisdiction Over Cross-Border Wrongs on the Internet, 54 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 585, 616–17 (July 2005). 
 82. Bone, supra note 75, at 311–12. 
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a single publication rule, plaintiffs are able to bring multiple claims 
abroad as they actively seek the court with the most favorable substan-
tive defamation law. Despite these strong criticisms,83 Fiona Shevill is 
the European Union’s status quo approach to choice of law for defama-
tion claims and has been defended by one French practitioner as creating 
a “sensible rule” for dealing with the ephemeral nature of such dam-
ages.84 
B. The Exercise of Domestic Jurisdiction over Foreign Publishers 
A number of cases addressing defamation claims highlight the growing 
trend of national courts exercising jurisdiction over foreign publishers 
and individuals. In many of these cases, the speaker or publisher is domi-
ciled in the United States and only has contact with the forum state via 
the Internet. Courts nonetheless routinely adjudicate plaintiff’s claims 
under domestic law when the forum’s only interest is protecting the repu-
tation of individuals—some of whom are not even citizens of the given 
forum—which is minimal compared with the U.S. interest of protecting 
free speech interests.85 
Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick occurred in Australia and is therefore be-
yond the scope of Rome II, yet this case has become both symbolic and 
admonitory in terms of the dangers of universal jurisdiction for defama-
tion claims arising from publication on the Internet.86 Furthermore, 
courts in other English common-law countries have found Gutnick’s ra-
tionale to be persuasive.87 In Gutnick, the High Court of Australia exer-
cised jurisdiction and imposed Australian law over Dow Jones, the 
United States-based publisher of Barron’s Online.88 While acknowledg-
ing the defendant’s argument that subjecting foreign publishers to defa-
                                                                                                             
 83. See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 997–99. 
 84. Pierre Véron, Thirty Years of Experience with the Brussels Convention in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 431, 445 (2002). 
 85. While it is true that publishers can avoid liability while still retaining their full 
free-speech interests domestically by limiting access to U.S. websites abroad, this “virtual 
bordering” of the Internet is problematic. Svantesson, supra note 1, at 65–69. 
 86. Notably, Gutnick has been cited with approval by a number of courts within 
Europe. See, e.g., Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1329, paras. 29–31. 
 87. John Di Bari, A Survey of the Internet Jurisdiction Universe, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. 
REV. 123, 131 n.46 (2005). 
 88. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575. The court seemed to 
champion Australian defamation law which, unlike the United States, places a higher 
value on reputation over free expression and the market-place of ideas. Id. at 650–51 
(Callinan, J., concurring). The court also seemed concerned with preventing “American 
legal hegemony” whereby U.S. publishers would obtain unfair economic advantages over 
those living outside the United States. Id. at 653–54. 
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mation actions “may have substantial consequences,” the court nonethe-
less held that creating certainty does not mean the court was bound to 
enforce foreign law.89 Thus, the court was unconcerned with the expecta-
tions of the publisher90 and, furthermore, the court held that publication 
on the Internet did not create a special circumstance as far as applying 
Australian law was concerned.91 
The court also was not persuaded that the fact that the United States 
provides greater protection to publishers under the First Amendment 
should be determinative, holding that Australian law “provides an appro-
priate balance which does justice to both a publisher and the subject of a 
publication.”92 While Gutnick was decided on jurisdictional grounds, the 
key to the court’s analysis was Australia’s right to exercise Australian 
law over a foreign publisher.93 As one commentator noted, two undercur-
rents seem to have motivated the court’s decision: first, the court was 
                                                                                                             
 89. “[C]ertainty does not necessarily mean singularity. What is important is that pub-
lishers can act with confidence, not that they be able to act according to a single legal 
system, even if that system might, in some sense, be described as their ‘home’ legal sys-
tem.”  Id. at 599–600 (majority opinion). 
 90. Id. at 649 (Callinan, J., concurring). 
The appellant argued that the respondent, having set out to make money in the 
United States, must expect to be subjected to lawful scrutiny in that country. 
No doubt the fact of lawful scrutiny in that country, if such the publication was, 
would provide a defence to the appellant to defamation proceedings there. That 
fact does not however have anything to say about unlawful publication in this 
country. 
Id. 
 91. Id. at 649–50. 
If people wish to do business in, or indeed travel to, or live in, or utilise the in-
frastructure of different countries, they can hardly expect to be absolved from 
compliance with the laws of those countries. The fact that publication might 
occur everywhere does not mean that it occurs nowhere. Multiple publication in 
different jurisdictions is certainly no novelty in a federation such as Australia. 
Id. 
 92. Id. at 651. 
 93. See id. at 640–42 (Kirby, J., concurring). It should be noted that, instead of chal-
lenging the judgment’s enforcement in U.S. courts, see infra Part II.C, Dow Jones instead 
brought a suit in front of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”) for 
violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: 
The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International 
Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 549 (Jan. 2005). While the UNHCR suit was likely abandoned 
when Dow Jones settled the Australian defamation case, this suit does raise an interesting 
question as to how international courts might become involved in resolving the balance 
between free speech and reputation in defamation claims. Id. 
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troubled by the entrenchment of U.S. courts in adjudicating defamation 
claims; and second, the court was not persuaded that the Internet posed 
unique communication possibilities.94 Yet, as Justice Kirby noted in his 
concurrence, the court’s decision substantially raised the risk of imposing 
global liability on publishers.95 Gutnick stands at least symbolically at a 
troubling extreme of courts imposing domestic defamation law over for-
eign publishers.96 
Gutnick is hardly alone, especially in European courts.97 England has 
similarly exercised its right to apply domestic law over a foreign pub-
lisher in a non-Internet context. In Berezovsky v. Forbes Inc., a Russian 
tycoon sued the U.S. publication Forbes for false allegations of corrup-
tion and unscrupulous dealings.98 Although only 2,000 of the 765,000 
total copies were distributed in the United Kingdom, a divided House of 
Lords nonetheless held that the United Kingdom was a proper forum to 
hear the plaintiff’s claim.99 The court’s analysis focused on the defen-
dant’s awareness of where the publication would be received, which 
some have argued mirrors the U.S. approach.100 Berezovsky reveals a far 
more flexible approach whereby the dissemination of only 2,000 issues is 
deemed “significant,” with the court instead focusing on the plaintiff’s 
injury rather than the defendant’s connection with the forum.101 This 
flexibility has also extended to other contexts of English defamation 
claims, including permitting a plaintiff to amend his claim when he mis-
                                                                                                             
 94. Di Bari, supra note 87, at 130–31. 
 95. Dow Jones v. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 643 (Kirby, J., concurring). 
 96. Two practitioners asked “Could You Be Gutnicked?,” further explaining that “to 
Gutnick” means “to make an internet publisher liable (for defamation or otherwise) in a 
foreign jurisdiction.”  Tina Glover & Helen Padley, Could You Be Gutnicked? Is Rome II 
a Fitting Sequel for Publishers?, Denton Wilde Sapte TransMiT (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.dentonwildesapte.com/assets/1/14921.pdf. 
 97. Italy has also held that, as long as a potentially defamatory statement has been 
“perceived” in Italy, then “the offence must be deemed to have been perpetrated on the 
national territory and the Italian state is entitled to jurisdiction.” Yulia A. Timofeeva, 
Worldwide Prescriptive Jurisdiction in Internet Content Controversies: A Comparative 
Analysis, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 211–12 (2005). 
 98. Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] E.M.L.R. 643 (H.L.). 
 99. Id. at 654–56. 
 100. Matthew E. Babcock, et. al., Publishing Without Borders: Internet Jurisdictional 
Issues, Internet Choice of Law Issue, ISP Immunity, and On-Line Anonymous Speech,  
651 PLI/PAT 9, 43 (May 2, 2001). 
 101. Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] E.M.L.R. at 651–52. In dissent, Lord Hoffman 
noted that the plaintiff’s reputation was based on activities in Russia and that the plaintiff 
was therefore “forum shopping in the most literal sense.”  Id. at 668 (Hoffman, L.J., dis-
senting). 
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takenly referred to the American, rather than English, edition of an alleg-
edly defamatory publication.102 
Further evidence of the English permissive approach can be seen in 
Harrods Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., where the Queen’s Bench exercised 
jurisdiction against Dow Jones, the United States publisher of the Wall 
Street Journal, in connection with material published about the English 
department store Harrod’s.103 Citing Gutnick and Fiona Shevill, the court 
concluded that the Wall Street Journal was circulated in England based 
on the “small number of copies” of the newspaper received by English 
subscribers as well as the “limited number of hits emanating from [Eng-
land] on the relevant page” of Wall Street Journal’s website.104 The Eng-
lish Court also rejected Dow Jones’ forum non conveniens105 argu-
ment.106 Notably, Dow Jones appealed to the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, which in turn held that the Eng-
lish proceedings would provide a more appropriate remedy and therefore 
declined to intervene on the jurisdiction of the English Court.107 The 
Southern District of New York also rejected Dow Jones’ argument that 
the court should prevent all proceedings in foreign courts, noting that it 
was unlikely that foreign courts would recognize such an injunction.108 
Harrods confirms that, under Fiona Shevill’s flexible approach, Eng-
land’s pro-plaintiff defamation laws have provided potential litigants 
with an attractive forum to bring claims against publishers,109 and that 
protection from U.S. courts is not always granted. 
Outside of the journalism context, English courts have consistently 
held that merely publishing a statement on the Internet gives rise to a 
defamation case within domestic jurisdiction.110 In Godfrey v. Demon 
Internet Ltd., the English Queen’s Bench held that a defamation claim 
                                                                                                             
 102. Reuben v. Time Inc, [2003] E.W.H.C. 1430, paras. 73–89 (Q.B.) (permitting a 
plaintiff to amend his complaint to refer to the English rather than American publication 
of Forbes, even though a claim in England based on the American edition would not be 
proper). 
 103. Harrods Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., [2003] E.W.H.C. 1162 (Q.B.). 
 104. Id. para. 36. 
 105. “The doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the law—
may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, 
it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might 
originally have been brought.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (2nd Pocket Ed. 2001).  
 106. Harrods Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., [2003] E.W.H.C. 1162, para 45. 
 107. Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 
346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 108. Id. at 412. 
 109. Supra note 13. 
 110. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 201. 
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could be brought against an Internet provider based on an Internet news-
group posting.111 Because the Internet provider did not respond to the 
plaintiff’s request to remove the offensive content, the court held that the 
Internet provider played an active role and, like a bookshop, library, or 
magazine wholesaler, was liable for the content it carried on its server.112 
Litigation between public figures also reveals that England is an attrac-
tive forum for a plaintiff to bring a defamation claim, even when the de-
fendant has little connection with the forum. In Lewis v. King, the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal held that U.S. boxing promoter Don King had per-
mission to bring a defamation suit in England against another U.S. de-
fendant.113 Even though both parties were domiciled in the United States, 
the court held that jurisdiction in England was proper because the alleg-
edly defamatory statement had been downloaded in England and the 
plaintiff claimed an interest in protecting his reputation in England.114 
Lewis v. King highlights the problem of forum shopping in England, in 
that the court acknowledged that if the plaintiff’s claim been brought in 
the United States, it would not have survived.115 Here, it is notable that 
the court made no reference to Fiona Shevill. 
More recently, actor and the Governor of California Arnold Schwar-
zenegger was sued by a U.K. television presenter for making allegedly 
defamatory remarks in response to accusations about past infidelities.116 
Citing Gutnick, Lewis, and Fionna Shevill, Justice Eady of the Queen’s 
Bench easily found that England was a proper forum to hear the plain-
tiff’s claim, since “internet publication takes place in any jurisdiction 
where the relevant words are read or downloaded,” “[t]here is no ‘single 
publication rule’” in multi-state defamation claims, and the plaintiff had 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. In the United States, internet providers are protected under the Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996 § 230(c)(1), which states that: “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider.”  Further, courts have held that 
under the Act, an Internet provider is not liable for any defamatory content even when a 
plaintiff contacts the provider to remove the content. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, 
958 F.Supp. 1124 (E.D.Va 1997). One commentator has noted that if Zeran were heard in 
England, the issue would instead be whether the provider had “acted expeditiously to 
remove material following complaints.” LAW COMMISSION SCOPING STUDY NO. 2, supra 
note 18, at 17. 
 112. Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 201. 
 113. Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ.) 1329 (pertaining to comments by the lawyer 
of boxer Lennox Lewis about boxing promoter Don King published on two websites). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Richardson v. Schwarzengger, [2004] EWHC 2422 (Q.B.). 
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proved that she “has suffered at least some damage” within the forum.117 
The court also dismissed the defendant’s forum non conveniens argu-
ment since, under Berezovsky and Lewis, “the scales come down posi-
tively in favour of the English Court.”118 Schwarzenegger ultimately 
chose to settle the lawsuit rather than contest it in the English courts.119 
Courts only decline to exercise jurisdiction when a publisher limits ac-
cess via the Internet. In Bangoura v. Washington Post, the Court of Ap-
peals of Ontario held that a defamation claim against the Washington 
Post by a citizen of Guinea who had moved to Ontario could not be 
heard by a Canadian court.120 The court noted that the Washington Post 
had only seven subscribers in all of Ontario.121 Further, while the article 
was available over the Internet free of charge for only fourteen days after 
publication, thereafter readers had to pay to view the article.122 Only one 
person had paid for the article after the fourteen-day window, and that 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. (citations omitted). 
 118. Id. The court noted the following factors: 
(i) The Claimant is a United Kingdom citizen; 
(ii) She is resident here; 
(iii) She works here; 
(iv) She is widely known through work here and has an established reputation 
in this country; 
(v) She has no comparable connection with any other jurisdiction, including the 
United States; 
(vi) In the light of the presumption, to which I have referred, damage to her 
reputation has been suffered here; 
(vii) The underlying events, if there is ever to be a plea of justification, took 
place here at the Dorchester Hotel in December 2000; 
(viii) English law is applicable to the publication in this country. 
Id. paras. 28-29. 
 119. Michael R. Blood, Schwarzenegger Settles Groping Lawsuit, THE GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), Aug. 26, 2006 (“The agreement spares the governor from what could have been a 
potentially embarrassing trial as he campaigns for a second term.”). 
 120. Bangoura v. Wash. Post, [2005] O.J. 3849 (Ont. C.A. Sept. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2005/september/C41379.htm (holding that an 
Ontario citizen could not bring libel claim against U.S. newspaper given the tenuous 
connection between the publication and Ontario). Notably, the lower court had ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff in a decision that relied heavily on Gutnick. Bangoura v. Wash. Post, 
235 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 573. 
 121. Bangoura v. Wash. Post, [2005] O.J. 3849. 
 122. Id. 
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was the plaintiff’s counsel.123 Bangoura is rare in that a domestic court 
declined to exercise jurisdiction over a defamation claim against a for-
eign publisher, but this might be due solely to the case’s unique facts and 
circumstances. It is particularly notable that a Canadian court rendered 
this decision, and that English courts have rejected similar arguments.124 
Further, the decision shows that restricting access to online publications 
is one method for publishers to avoid defamation claims in foreign juris-
dictions. Given that journalism reaches its public function through free 
access,125 Bangoura highlights the growing danger that publishers might 
start limiting online access in order to cope with defamation claims from 
abroad. In other words, at best only a de minimus contact with the forum 
will permit a court to dismiss a defamation claim, meaning that publish-
ers have a strong incentive to limit access abroad. 
C. Enforcement of Foreign Defamation Judgments in U.S. Courts 
U.S. publishers have one additional remedy available: convincing a 
domestic court to refuse to enforce a foreign judgment. In the European 
Union, judgments made in other Member States are enforceable through 
multilateral treaty.126 However, there is no such reciprocity in the United 
States, and American courts have, at times, refused to enforce foreign 
judgments. In the U.S., enforcement of foreign judgments is generally 
recognized under the principle of international comity,127 but foreign 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. 
 124. The Bangoura court stated it did not find Gutnick to be “helpful in determining 
the issue before [the] court.” Id. The English Queen’s Bench rejected a similar argument 
by a publisher whose article was downloaded only five times within the given forum.  
Jameel v. Dow Jones & Co. [2005] Q.B. 946, 951. 
 125. For instance, the First Amendment right of access is based upon “the common 
understanding that a ‘major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs.’ By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to 
ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our re-
publican system of self-government.”  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 
596, 604 (1982) (citation omitted). U.S. courts apply heightened scrutiny to prior re-
straints of the press out of a recognition that access to communication is vital to free ex-
pression under the First Amendment. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 
558, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 126. Regulation (EC) creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, 
supra note 51.  However, courts can refuse to recognize foreign judgments “if such rec-
ognition is manifestly contrary to public policy of the Member State in which recognition 
is sought.”  Brussels I Regulation, supra note 51, art. 34(1). 
 127. “The international comity principle counsels for recognition of foreign proceed-
ings to the extent that such proceedings are determined to be orderly, fair, and not detri-
mental to the nation’s interests.” 45 AM. JUR. 2D Int’l Law § 7 (2005). 
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defamation judgments present an exception where the U.S. court could 
refuse if the judgment cannot be sustained under the First Amendment.128 
Notably, in Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc. a New York 
court held that a defamation judgment in the High Court of Justice in 
London against a New York wire service was unenforceable.129 The 
court stated that enforcing the judgment would violate the First Amend-
ment given that, in England, the burden of proof in a libel action rests 
with the defendant.130 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch is an even more extreme 
and famous example of a U.S. court refusing to enforce a foreign defa-
mation verdict.131 The Maryland Court of Appeals refused to enforce an 
English judgment against an English citizen who, prior to moving to the 
United States, had written a letter to the editor that was published by an 
English newspaper.132 The court upheld the trial court’s decision that 
English law was antithetical to the United States and Maryland free 
speech guarantees, and therefore “repugnant to the public policy” of 
Maryland and unenforceable.133 
These cases show the uncertainty wrought when courts impose their 
domestic law on foreign publishers, especially when those nations have 
vastly divergent standards of protecting free expression. U.S. courts have 
indeed acted to protect the free-speech interests of American publish-
ers.134 One commentator has argued that the “non-enforceability of for-
eign judgments that contravene the First Amendment may alleviate 
United States defendants’ fears of violating the libel laws of other coun-
tries.”135 This protection, however, only occurs after proceedings in for-
eign jurisdictions, amounting to a notable waste of judicial resources.136 
This protection also does not curtail the chilling effect imposed on pub-
lishers, who must now decide whether continued publication on the 
                                                                                                             
 128. SACK ON DEFAMATION § 15.4.  A number of states have adopted the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Act (UFMJA), 13 U.L.A. 419 (1980), which seeks to increase 
the likelihood that foreign judgments will be recognized in the United States and restates 
the common law rules.  SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 820–21. 
 129. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 130. Id. at 664–65. 
 131. 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997). 
 132. Id. at 251. 
 133. Id. at 236.  Notably, Maryland has adopted the UFMJA, but the court held that 
non-enforcement in this instance was proper under the UFMJA’s public policy exception. 
Id. at 238. 
 134. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). See also Desai 
v. Hersh, 719 F.Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 135. Barendt, supra note 15, at 737. 
 136. Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 986. 
2006] ROME II 291 
Internet is worth the likelihood of protracted litigation abroad.137 Fur-
thermore, liability in foreign jurisdictions still presents a major point of 
concern to publishers with assets in a given forum.138 When one consid-
ers that today, almost all major newspapers have bureaus, foreign edi-
tions, and personnel spread across the globe, the non-enforcement route 
seems even less viable. 
III. ROME II WASN’T BUILT IN A DAY 
Even though Rome II can be seen as part of the European Union’s at-
tempt to harmonize the laws of Member States,139 the backdrop of for-
eign liability for defamation claims has colored the convention’s drafting 
process. Given publishing groups’ unease with the status quo approach, 
they saw Rome II as an opportunity to create a more stable rule for 
defamation claims that would, hopefully, protect their interests. 
The first European Union treaty governing choice of law was the Brus-
sels Convention,140 which was interpreted by the ECJ in Bier and Fiona 
Shevill.141 However, the Brussels Convention created a number of meth-
ods for claimants to opt out of one jurisdiction in favor of another,142 
rendering the treaty ineffective.143 Throughout the 1970s, the European 
Union worked towards creating a more stable choice-of-law agreement 
for disputes, beginning with claims based in contractual relationships.144 
Eventually the European Community produced Rome I, which states that 
the choice of law for contractual claims is “the law of the country with 
which it is most closely connected.”145 Rome I is applicable to parties 
                                                                                                             
 137. See Wimmer, supra note 38, at 6. 
 138. Blake Cooper, Note, The U.S. Libel Law Conundrum and the Necessity of Defen-
sive Corporate Measures in Lessening International Internet Liability, 21 CONN. J. INT’L 
L. 127, 138 (2005). 
 139. See Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 5. 
 140. Brussels Convention, supra note 48. 
 141. Supra Part II.A. 
 142. Brussels Convention, supra note 48, arts. 2–6. 
 143. The Brussels Convention’s flexible rules allowed litigants to actively and easily 
choose the jurisdiction with laws most favorable to their claim. Rome II (European 
Commission 2003 draft), supra note 20, at 3. 
 144. Giuliano & Lagarde, supra note 47. 
 145. Rome I, supra note 21, art. 4(1). In comparison: 
[T]he country which is “most closely connected” with the contract usually 
means the country where the performer of the contract, if it is a business, has its 
central administration or, in the case of a trade or a profession, the location of 
its principal place of business. This alternative most closely resembles choice 
of law principles applied by United States courts. 
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residing in any state in the world, not just European Union Member 
States.146 In turn, Rome II will be the “natural extension” of unification 
rules relating to private international law in the European Union.147 
Two provisions of the Treaty on European Union148 affect the drafting 
and scope of Rome II. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union re-
quires that “litigants can assert their rights in the courts and before the 
authorities of all the Member States, enjoying facilities equivalent to 
those they enjoy in their own country.”149 Declaration 20, which the 
European Union amended to the Treaty on European Union in 1997, 
states that choice-of-law measures “shall not prevent any Member State 
from applying its constitutional rules relating to freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression in other media.”150 Member States drafted Decla-
ration 20 due to concerns that, under Article 2, they would be required to 
enforce judgments antithetical to their domestic free-speech protec-
tions.151 Although neither the European Parliament nor the European 
Commission made any explicit reference to Declaration 20 while draft-
ing Rome II,152 it paved the way for the drafters of Rome II to carve out 
                                                                                                             
James E. Meadows, International Electronic Commerce with the European Union, 590 
PRAC. LAW INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 343, 349 (Feb. 2000). 
 146. Rome I, supra note 21, art. 1. 
 147. Rome II (European Commission 2003 draft), supra note 20, at 3. 
 148. [2002] O.J. (C 325). In addition to changing the title of the “European Economic 
Community” to simply the “European Community” or “European Union,” the Treaty on 
European Union established a European governing body and called for a common mone-
tary system. Id. 
 149. Rome II (European Commission 2003 draft), supra note 20, at 2. 
 150. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Es-
tablishing European Communities and Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340). 
 151. Declaration 20 was drafted by Sweden due to worries about enforcing defamation 
judgments that are in violation of Swedish constitutional protections of freedom of 
speech and expression. European Group for Private International Law (EGPIL), Working 
Sessions of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting (Sept. 17–19, 2004), available at 
http://www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip/reunionstravail/gedip-reunions-14t-en.html [hereinafter 
EGPIL Working Sessions]. These concerns mirror the refusal of U.S. courts to enforce 
foreign defamation claims. Supra Part II.C. 
 152. The European Parliament did, however, note that one other European Parliament 
directive, the so called “e-commerce directive,” colors the application of Rome II. Euro-
pean Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on 
electronic commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). This directive enshrines a country-of-
origin rule to e-commerce claims, but also provides that the directive “does not establish 
additional rules on private international law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of 
Courts.” Id. Thus, the drafters of Rome II created a rule in the field of e-commerce that if 
the application of Rome II’s choice-of-law provisions “result in an unjustified barrier to 
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an exception to the general rule153 for the choice of law relating to defa-
mation claims.154 Rome II’s drafters also noted that the divergent defa-
mation laws of Member States would raise “difficult issues” requiring 
special consideration.155 
Rome II’s drafting process has been slow and deliberate, owing to the 
fact that consensus must be achieved among not only all Member States, 
but also between the European Parliament (the European Union’s legisla-
tive branch) and the European Commission (the European Union’s ex-
ecutive branch) as part of the treaty’s co-decision process.156 The Euro-
pean Union began drafting Rome II in 2002.157 In addition to public hear-
ings, the European Commission sought and received over eighty written 
commentaries from interested parties.158 The position of newspaper and 
broadcasting groups reflected the growing concern with foreign defama-
tion liability, in that publishers must comply with foreign press laws un-
der a flexible rule.159 These groups suggested that courts instead apply 
publishers’ national defamation laws, since they reflect each country’s 
particular tradition and values regarding freedom of the press.160 Aca-
                                                                                                             
trade, the national court would be obliged . . . not to apply that law.” Rome II (Working 
Document), supra note 71, at 2–3. 
 153. Rome II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20, art. 3. 
 154. “Article 6 in the proposed Rome II Regulation has something to do with this dec-
laration. It probably made it easier to introduce the exception to Article [6] for the protec-
tion of freedom of the press.” EGPIL Working Sessions, supra note 145. 
 155. Rome II (Working Document), supra note 71, at 3. 
 156. Rome II (European Commission 2003 draft), supra note 20, at 5–6. 
 157. Drafting of Rome II was triggered in 1998 by the Action Plan of the Council and 
Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an 
area of freedom, security and justice. 1999 O.J. (C 19) 1 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999Y0123(01):EN:HTML. All 
European Union nations participated in the drafting as well as the adoption of Rome II 
except for Denmark. Rome II (Working Document), supra note 71, at 2 n.1. Thus, once 
the European Union adopts Rome II, Member States will apply the Rome II conflict-of-
laws rules as regards the application of Danish law, but Denmark will continue to apply 
existing rules of international law. Id. 
 158. Symeon C. Symeonides, Tort Conflicts and Rome II: A View from Across (2004), 
available at http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/pages/rome2.html (follow “‘Tort Con-
flicts and Rome II: a view from accross’ [sic], by S.C. Symeonides.” hyperlink). 
 159. European Commission, Justice and Foreign Affairs, Summary and contributions 
of the consultation “Rome II” (Oct. 31, 2002), http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/ 
news/consulting_public/rome_ii/news_summary_rome2_en.htm [hereinafter Summary 
and contributions]. 
 160. European Newspaper Publishers’ Association (ENPA), ENPA position on the 
draft proposal for a Council Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obliga-
tions (Sept. 15, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consult 
ing_public/rome_ii/euro_newsp_enpa_en.pdf. 
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demic commentators, in turn, noted that the status quo choice-of-law ap-
proach permitted plaintiffs to bring a defamation claim in any forum 
where their reputation was harmed.161 These commentators suggested 
that Rome II should continue to permit plaintiffs to choose where to 
bring a defamation suit while adopting certain exceptions to address pub-
lishing groups’ expectations.162 
From these discussions, the European Commission163 advanced the 
first draft of Rome II on July 22, 2003.164 Unlike some choice-of-law 
rules that attempt to create a standard black-letter rule applicable to all 
types of claims,165 Rome II adopted the academic commentators’ ap-
proach of creating a general rule166 and then carving out exceptions based 
on the content of certain claims.167 The first draft of Rome II, however, 
created a place-of-harm approach for defamation claims that reads: 
As regards the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of a violation of privacy or rights relating to the personality, the law 
of the country in which the most significant element or elements of the 
loss or damage occur or are likely to occur shall be applicable, but a 
manifestly closer connection with a particular country may be deemed 
to exist having regard to factors such as the country to which a publica-
                                                                                                             
Each Member State has its own traditional approach to press freedom in their 
press law. It is a right which evolves nationally in harmony with their moral, 
legal historical, religious and political values and traditions. Newspapers are 
usually addressed to and bought by their national, regional or local readers as 
their articles reflect the values which characterise their readership. It is there-
fore natural and logical that publishers first respect and apply their national 
press law, which is based on these values. 
Id. 
 161. Summary and contributions, supra note 159. 
 162. Id. 
 163. The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union and 
currently consists of 25 Commissioners, one from each member of the European Union. 
The European Parliament, on the other hand, is the EU’s parliamentary body and consists 
of MPs directly elected by each member nation. 
 164. Rome II (European Commission 2003 draft), supra note 20. 
 165. See, e.g., European Group for Private International Law (EGPIL), Proposal for a 
European Convention on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Sept. 25–27, 
1998) available at http://www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip/documents/gedip-documents-7pe.html. 
The EGPIL choice-of-law proposal was drafted by a private organization free from po-
litical pressure or compromises, and has been described as being “as close to perfection 
as humanly possible.”  Symeonides, supra note 158. Funding for the EGPIL proposal 
derived from the European Commission, and the text became the basis for the early drafts 
of Rome II. Rome II (European Commission 2003 draft), supra note 20, at 4. 
 166. Rome II (European Parliament Draft), supra note 20, art. 3. 
 167. See Symeonides, supra note 158, at 2. 
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tion or broadcast is principally directed or the language of the publica-
tion or broadcast or sales or audience size in a given country as a pro-
portion of total sales or audience size or a combination of these factors. 
This provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to Internet publication.168 
The “manifestly closer” exception was intended to address publishers’ 
concerns, but publishing groups viewed this as too vague to be effective 
and the rule was greatly criticized.169 
In particular, publishing groups noted that a place-of-harm rule would 
make it necessary to employ legal advisors with expertise in each foreign 
jurisdiction, which would create practical and financial burdens in addi-
tion to a chilling effect caused by self-censorship out of fear of suit under 
foreign defamation laws.170 Even in the United Kingdom, which has pro-
plaintiff defamation laws,171 British publishing groups opposed the place-
of-harm rule, noting that they were at least knowledgeable about their 
domestic defamation law and would be guaranteed the opportunity to 
defend their actions.172 Given the myriad of overlapping forums capable 
                                                                                                             
 168. EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2003) 427 (2005), Legal Affairs Committee Draft, art. 
6(1), amend. 27 (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/page 
s/rome2.html (follow “Commission’s proposal [COM (2003) 0427]” hyperlink) [herein-
after Rome II (Legal Affairs Committee draft)]. 
 169. See ICRT Comments on the Wallis Report on the Rome II Regulation (June 21, 
2004), www.icrt.org/pos_papers/2004/040621_EE_Rome%20II.pdf [hereinafter ICRT 
Comments]. The International Communications Round Table, which includes such cor-
porations as Amazon.com, Google, Microsoft, News Corp., Sony, and the Walt Disney 
Corporation, noted: 
Cross-border cases in the field of defamation and privacy occur very infre-
quently. Moreover, when they do occur, the applicable law is de facto the law 
of the country where the media provider is established. Figures clearly demon-
strate the exceptional character of cross-border cases applying a law other than 
the law of the forum in this area. Freedom of expression in the media is not, 
and should not be, within the sphere of the proper functioning of [the European 
market]. 
Id. 
 170. European Federation of Journalists, Opinion of the EFJ Regulation on the law 
applicable to non contractual obligations (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://ifj-
europe.org/default.asp?index=2916. Publishing groups also noted that a place-of-harm 
rule could lead to “farcical” situations where, for example, the editor of a British newspa-
per aimed at a British audience could nonetheless be sued in a Belgian court for breach-
ing Belgian defamation law for writing about a Belgian criminal. Gordon Darroch, When 
Talk Is No Longer Cheap, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar. 16, 2004. 
 171. See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 937–49. 
 172. “If you have a country which doesn’t recognise truth as a defence against libel, 
who’s to say we wouldn’t have to apply those rules here?” Darroch, supra note 174, 
(quoting Clare Hoban, Head of Legal Affairs for the Periodical Publishers’ Association). 
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of hearing a given defamation claim,173 the place-of-harm rule would 
allow courts to apply domestic law to publications whose only contact 
was via the Internet and would thus only add to publishers’ uncertainty. 
The policy behind the place-of-harm approach was crystallized in the 
draft of Rome II produced by Legal Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament: “Whereas to select the lex loci delicti commissi174 as the ba-
sic solution has its attractions, more flexibility needs to be built into the 
rules so as to allow the courts to do justice in individual cases. Moreover, 
it is important to respect party autonomy.”175 Academic commentators 
also noted that “very few legal systems appl[y] the law of the place of 
publication” and that the draft did in fact take steps to protect publishing 
interests.176 
However, in 2005, the European Parliament responded to intense lob-
bying by publishing groups and produced a substantially different ap-
proach to Rome II.177 Specifically, the new draft adopted a place-of-
                                                                                                             
 173. See supra Part II.B. 
 174. “The law of the place where the offense was committed.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 416 (2nd Pocket Ed. 2001). In other words, the law of the place of harm. 
 175. Rome II (Legal Affairs Committee draft), supra note 172, recital 7, amend. 3 
justification. 
 176. Summary and contributions, supra note 163. 
 177. In 2003, the first Rome II draft was transmitted by the European Council to the 
European Parliament as part of the co-decision process between the two bodies. From 
2003 through 2005, Rome II was substantially edited by the European Parliament’s Legal 
Affairs Committee under the leadership Rome II’s rappourter and Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament (MEP) Diana Wallis. Rome II (Legal Affairs Committee draft), supra 
note 168. On June 27, 2005, the Legal Affairs Committee produced a new draft that kept 
intact the place-of-harm approach with minor modifications. Id. The European Federation 
of Journalists and other groups representing journalists and media lobbied the MEPs to 
reject the place-of-harm rule. David S. Korzenik & Aaron Warshaw, EU Parliament’s 
Last Minute Surprise Changes to “Rome II” Rescue Press Rights, MLRC 
MEDIALAWLETTER (Media Law Resource Center, New York, N.Y.), July 2005, at 50. 
This lobbying was particularly aimed at an ad hoc committee of MEPs who shared an 
interest in matters pertaining to freedom of expression and the press. Id. The ad hoc 
committee was persuaded to modify the draft of Rome II to create a place-of-publication 
approach to defamation claims at a plenary session in Strasbourg on July 6, 2005. Rome 
II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20. The European Parliament transmitted its 
working place-of-publication draft to the European Council which, on September 29, 
2005 in Brussels, began considering the defamation provision of Rome II. General Secre-
tariat, Council of the European Union, Notice of Meeting and Provisional Agenda (July 
28, 2005), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/cm02/cm02802.en05. 
pdf. By the time of the European Council’s meeting, the only provision of Rome II not 
settled was Article 6 relating to defamation claims because, over the prior three years, all 
other issues relating to Rome II had been substantially resolved. 
2006] ROME II 297 
publication rule for the choice of law for defamation claims in lieu of the 
first draft’s place-of-harm rule: 
As regards the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of a violation of privacy or rights relating to the personality, the law 
of the country in which the most significant element or elements of the 
loss or damage occur or are likely to occur shall be applicable. 
Where the violation is caused by the publication of printed matter or by 
a broadcast, the country in which the most significant element or ele-
ments of the damage occur or are likely to occur shall be deemed to be 
the country to which the publication or broadcasting service is princi-
pally directed or, if this is not apparent, the country in which editorial 
control is exercised, and that country’s law shall be applicable. The 
country to which the publication or broadcast is directed shall be de-
termined in particular by the language of the publication or broadcast or 
by sales or audience size in a given country as a proportion of total 
sales or audience size or by a combination of those factors.178 
Under this approach, Member States would apply the defamation law 
of the publisher’s country of origin as determined by where the publica-
tion is directed and where editorial control is exercised.179 The European 
Parliament drafters noted that the place-of-publication rule was necessary 
to safeguard European Union “press traditions,” and would create a more 
stable and predictable result for publishers.180 Publishing groups hailed 
the new draft as a “victory for press freedom and a testament to the ef-
forts” of media lobbyists who had communicated the potential damage of 
the place-of-harm rule.181 Under the place-of-publication rule, publishers 
would therefore only be judged under their domestic defamation law, 
                                                                                                             
 178. Rome II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20, art. 6(1), amend. 57 (empha-
sis added). 
 179. Id. art. 6(1), amend. 57. 
 180. Id. art. 26a, amend. 54(3). 
In a communications environment operating increasingly on a continent-wide 
basis, the various forms of law relating to the personality and historically estab-
lished press traditions in the European Union point to the need for more uni-
form prerequisites and rules for dispute resolution. The very nature, which mer-
its safeguarding, of press freedom and it role in society would suggest, how-
ever, that in the process priority should be given to media which deal responsi-
bly with rights relating to the personality . . . . 
Id. 
 181. Justice and Home Affairs: Parliament Gives Judges More Leeway on Rome II 
Choice-of-Law Regulation, EUROPEAN REPORT (July 9, 2005) (comments of European 
Publishers Council Director Angela Mills Wade). 
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while litigants would continue to have the ability to bring their claim in 
any forum where they were harmed. 
Arguably, a more restrictive choice-of-law provision would allow pub-
lishers to know in advance which defamation law is applicable when an 
article is posted online.182 However, balanced against this need for 
greater certainty is the claimants’ right to bring suit in the country where 
their reputation was damaged under the law of that jurisdiction.183 These 
two policy concerns led to the contrasting approaches to the drafting of 
Rome II, reflecting flexibility in the place-of-harm rule184 and certainty 
in the place-of-publication rule.185 As such, the place-of-harm rule em-
bodies the status quo approach to choice of law for defamation claims,186 
while the latter place-of-publication rule was drafted in response to lob-
bying efforts by publishing groups and reflects a departure from the 
                                                                                                             
 182. European Federation of Journalists, Opinion of the EFJ on the ‘Rome II’ Regula-
tion on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Jan. 24, 2005), available at 
http://ifj-europe.org/default.asp?index=2916. 
 183. See LAW COMMISSION SCOPING STUDY NO. 2, supra note 18, at 39. 
 184. Rome II (Legal Affairs Committee draft)], supra note 168, art. 6(1), amend. 30. 
The Legal Affairs Committee draft also created an exception to the place-of-harm rule 
when “a manifestly closer connection with a particular country may be deemed to exist.”  
Id. This was intended to address publishers’ concern for certainty: 
As far as violations of privacy and rights relating to the personality are con-
cerned, the rapporteur takes the view that . . . the court should be able to con-
sider that a manifestly closer connection exists with the country of publication  
. . . having regard to sales per Member State, audience figures and so on . . . . 
[T]he court may also take account of the audience to which the publication or 
broadcast is principally directed. Given that Internet publications are also cov-
ered, it will be possible to avoid a situation in which different rules apply to the 
same publication, depending on whether it is made off- or on-line. Your rappor-
teur considers that this should conduce to greater legal certainty. 
Id. at 39. However, publishers argued that a “manifestly closer connection” is too vague 
to afford publishers any protection, especially because publications written in English are 
routinely accessed and understood in nations all over the world. Periodical Publishers 
Assoc., European ‘Defamation and Privacy’ Proposals Still a Threat to UK Publishers 
(Mar. 17, 2004), available at http://www.ppa.co.uk/cgi-bin/go.pl/news/article.html?uid= 
1232. 
 185. Rome II (European Parliament draft), supra note 20, art. 6, amend. 57. Indeed, 
every system of private international law reflects a tension between the opposing needs 
for both certainty and flexibility. Symeonides, supra note 158, at 2. 
 186. Rome II (Legal Affairs Committee draft), supra note 172, art. 6, justification. The 
Legal Affairs Committee draft made explicit reference to preserving the flexible ap-
proach utilized by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Fiona Shevill. Id. 
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growing trend of applying domestic defamation law to foreign publica-
tions.187 
By the winter of 2005, France, Belgium, and Hungary were most sup-
portive of the place-of-publication approach, but it appeared uncertain 
whether they could muster enough support for its adoption.188 Newer 
members of the European Union, in contrast, were most in favor of the 
place-of-harm rule.189 Ireland and Sweden seemed to support excluding 
defamation claims from Rome II altogether and instead relying on na-
tional choice-of-law provisions, and the United Kingdom sought a con-
sensus position.190 Germany supported adoption of a rule based on Fiona 
Shevill,191 which would limit the choice of law to only the nation of pub-
lication and the nation of harm.192 European publishing rights groups 
pressed for adoption of the place-of-publication rule.193 
                                                                                                             
 187. Remarks of Franco Frattini, 2005 O.J. (030) 1 (July 5, 2005) (European Parlia-
ment debates). Mr. Frattini stated that: 
The measure provides for a certain degree of flexibility for judges, in order to 
allow them to take account of exceptional circumstances. Such flexibility, how-
ever, has to be limited, in order to avoid compromising the general objective, or 
rather legal certainty. In that regard, it is clear that allowing judges to exercise 
full discretion would make it difficult to predetermine the legal certainty that is 
one of the main objectives of this initiative, since economic operators and citi-
zens wish to know in advance which law will apply to their situation . . . . I 
fully agree with the solution reached . . . on sensitive issues, such as press 
defamation and the link between international private law and the internal mar-
ket. They are two extremely delicate sectors and I believe that the compromise 
reached is satisfactory. 
Id. See also EU Proposal Adopted with Publisher-Friendly Amends, MAGAZINE WORLD, 
available at http://www.fipp.com/1053 (last visited Dec. 26, 2005) (“Successful lobbying 
from the European Magazine Publishers Association (FAEP) resulted in the Commission 
refining the proposal. The law applicable to defamation will now be consistent with the 
law applicable to all other non contractual obligations and will ensure greater clarity for 
publishers.”). 
 188. E-mail from Pamela Morinière, Authors’ Rights Campaigner, International Fed-
eration of Journalists (Oct. 14, 2005) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Supra Part II.A. 
 192. Non-Paper of the German Delegation, Article 6 of the Draft Regulation of Rome 
II (Sept. 29, 2005) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law). This compro-
mise amounted to, in practice, support for the place-of-harm rule. 
 193. Letter from the Association of Commercial Television in Europe, Association of 
European Radios, European Broadcasting Union, European Federation of Journalists, 
European Newspaper Publishers’ Association, European Publishers Council, European 
Federation of Magazine Publishing, and Federation of European Publishers to Members 
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Rather than resolving this internal conflict among Member States, in 
early 2006, the European Commission submitted a new draft that alto-
gether removed the defamation provision from the agreement.194 On one 
level, this maneuver reflected some Member States’ uneasiness with the 
place-of-publication rule, since it would favor the press too greatly over 
the reputational interests of litigants.195 As a parliamentary maneuver, 
this step—while appearing to merely postpone a substantive solution to 
the issue—essentially preserved the place-of-harm rule, which is the 
status quo approach to defamation claims, and prevented further debate 
on the issue. Thus, one representative of the European Parliament de-
scribed the European Commission’s action as “incredibly disappoint-
ing.”196 
At least for the short term, it appears doubtful that the European Union 
will adopt a blanket place-of-publication rule for publication claims, be-
cause Member States have to approve such a provision unanimously197 
and, as per the view of the European Commission, such a rule would fa-
                                                                                                             
of the Council Committee on Civil Law Matters (Sept. 26, 2005) (on file with Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law). 
 194. EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2003) 427, Amended proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) 
(Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/civil/do 
c/com_2006_83_en.pdf [hereinafter Rome II (European Commission Draft)]. 
 195. The European Commission noted that: 
[The place-of-publication rule] would change the substance of the rule applica-
ble to violations of privacy, particularly by the press. The Commission cannot 
accept this amendment, which is too generous to press editors rather than the 
victim of alleged defamation in the press and does not reflect the solution taken 
by a large majority of Member States. Since it is not possible to reconcile the 
Council’s text and the text adopted by Parliament at first reading, the Commis-
sion considers that the best solution to this controversial question is to exclude 
all press offences and the like from the proposal and delete Article 6 of the 
original proposal. 
Id. 
 196. Rome II (Diana Wallis MEP), http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/pages/rome2. 
html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).  Ms. Wallis noted that: 
It is incredibly disappointing that the Commission has decided to withdraw the 
provision relating to defamation from Rome II. Clearly this has pre-empted 
Member States from having detailed discussions in the Council. For the Coun-
cil to re-include defamation into the scope of the Regulation, Member States 
will have to unanimously agree on a common rule which at this stage proves to 
be impossible. 
Id. 
 197. Id. 
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vor publishers’ interests too greatly when compared to victims’ rights.198 
The current draft of Rome II is left with a “gaping hole” where the rule 
for defamation claims should be.199 While publishing groups only man-
aged what some have called a “magnificent gesture” in pressing for the 
place-of-publication rule,200 their efforts have brought forth their con-
cerns without bringing the European Union any closer to a workable so-
lution. Yet this impasse should not come as a surprise when looking at 
conflicts of law generally. As will be discussed in the next section, the 
modern American approach might, in some ways, be preferable to one 
                                                                                                             
 198. Viviane Reding, Member of the European Commission responsible for Informa-
tion Society and Media Reinforcing the competitiveness of Europe’s publishing industry, 
Address to the European Publishers Forum (Dec. 6, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/764. 
I must acknowledge that you publishers—and the broadcasters—have under-
taken a rather brilliant campaign in support of the “country of origin” principle. 
Because of you, the European Parliament has rejected “country of destination” 
in favour of “country of origin,” ignoring the advice of its own legal affairs 
committee. This puts the Commission in a difficult position. In spite of our 
strong belief in the country of origin principle, we know well that Member 
States will never accept the full “country of origin” principle in Rome II. It fa-
vours, in their view, publishers too much compared with victims. And Member 
States point out that the right to privacy is as much a fundamental right as free-
dom of expression. 
Id. 
 199. Press Release, Diana Wallis (Jan. 31, 2006) http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/ 
news/315.html?PHPSESSID=801ceb21. Ms. Wallis wrote that: 
We know only too well that this issue has been politically sensitive with the 
media, but why give up in the search for a solution now? The Parliament indi-
cated a starting point which the media agreed to at first reading; this should 
have been built on not disregarded. 
The failure to deal with this aspect of applicable law will leave a gaping hole in 
the legislation in a world where media is increasingly global and editors need 
certainty about which law will apply to their publications. Leaving it out just 
perpetuates the uncertainty about which of 25 or more legal regimes might ap-
ply and helps no-one, least of all the media. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200. Reding, supra note 198. 
Commenting on a spectacular, but very bloody British cavalry charge against 
Russian artillery during the Crimean war, a French General said “C’est magni-
fique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre.”  If I translate freely, “What a magnificent 
gesture, but how impractical.”  This is my view of your insistence on the 
“country of origin” principle in this context. 
Id. 
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that instead focuses on a given place (i.e., either the place of harm or the 
place of publication). 
IV. A WAY OUT OF THE MAZE? THE INTERESTS ANALYSIS APPROACH 
TO CHOICE OF LAW  
In addition to Rome II’s place-of-harm and place-of-publication rules, 
a number of other approaches have been proposed to create a workable 
solution to conflicts in defamation law.201 Even within contemporary 
choice-of-law approaches, there is a great deal of variety of rules and 
analyses.202 Despite the volume of suggested rules available to Rome II’s 
drafters, international defamation law is no closer to a solution—let 
alone a compromise among interested parties—as shown by the failure of 
the European Union to adopt a choice-of-law rule applicable to defama-
tion claims. We should not be surprised by this difficulty. As Dean 
Prosser wrote over fifty years ago: 
The realm of the conflict of laws [in defamation cases] is a dismal 
swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but 
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange 
and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite 
lost when engulfed and entangled in it.203 
The Internet has caused this swamp to become even more dismal. It 
has also caused a head-on collision between American defamation juris-
prudence under the First Amendment and the laws of other nations.204 
Rather than adding another layer to the quagmire, this Note argues that 
the solution lies not in formulating rules, but in re-approaching the prob-
lem with an eye toward the underlying substantive defamation laws.205 
The American experience with conflicts of laws provides some insight. 
                                                                                                             
 201. See, e.g., Svantesson, supra note 17, at 195 (proposing a rule whereby courts 
would never have jurisdiction for defamation claims arising from the Internet). 
 202. See O’Connor v. O’Connor, 519 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1986) (reproduced in 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 145–50) (noting that modern approaches include the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, the “governmental interest” analysis of Profes-
sor Brainerd Currie, and Professor Robert A. Leflar’s “choice-influencing considera-
tions” analysis); SACK ON DEFAMATION § 12.33 (noting that “about a dozen different 
approaches have been suggested to the problem of choice of law in multistate defamation 
cases”) (citation omitted). 
 203. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953)  
(cited by SACK ON DEFAMATION § 15.3). 
 204. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 901–
02, n.78 (2006) (noting that no other country in the world has adopted the “actual malice” 
standard endorsed under New York Times v. Sullivan). 
 205. Christopher J. Kunke recently made a similar argument about incorporating state 
interests analysis into Rome II, Kunke, supra note 25, at 1762–70, although his analysis 
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U.S. courts have grappled with choice-of-law rules for defamation 
claims in ways that mirror the struggles of the European Union.206 Thus, 
it should be no surprise that Rome II’s drafters studied the U.S. approach 
to choice of law for defamation claims, including the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, when weighing which approach to adopt.207 Yet, as is true 
of the European approach in general, Rome II’s drafters focused on terri-
toriality—i.e., creating a rule based on certain contacts between the pub-
lisher, the victim, and the forum—in attempting to promulgate a uniform 
rule applicable to all cases.208 Rome II’s drafters would have been well-
advised to consider adopting one key attribute of the modern American 
approach, namely a choice-of-law system that includes an examination of 
the policies that underlie competing laws.209 
Just as nations possess varying defamation laws based on their particu-
lar standards and traditions,210 U.S. jurisdictions also resolve defamation 
claims under differing standards.211 Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, courts should weigh, inter alia, “the relevant policies 
of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue” when determining the choice of 
law.212 For defamation claims arising from “aggregate communications” 
such as the multi-state publication of a newspaper, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) creates a presumptive rule in favor of a plaintiff’s domicile.213 Pro-
fessor Pielemeier has argued that, as applied, this rule is weak and am-
bivalent; therefore, the Restatement (Second) has failed to accomplish 
the kind of policy analysis that was envisioned under the modern inter-
ests analysis approach developed by Professor Brainerd Currie.214 It 
should also be noted that a number of U.S. states continue to apply the 
                                                                                                             
does not consider whether application of foreign defamation law undermines First 
Amendment jurisprudence. See supra Part II.C. Kunke suggests that “Rome II should 
favor the place of injury but allow for an adequate state interests analysis” and proposes 
an alternate rule for defamation claims. Kunke, supra note 25, at 1770. 
 206. See Pielemeier, supra note 7, at 56–57. 
 207. Rome II (Legal Affairs Committee Draft), supra note 168, at 40. 
 208. Kunke, supra note 25, at 1753–54. 
 209. See Pielemeier, supra note 7, at 68–69 (describing Professor Currie’s interests 
analysis as applied to multistate defamation claims). 
 210. Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 938–62. 
 211. Pielemeier, supra note 7, at 56–57. 
 212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1977). 
 213. Id. § 150. 
 214. Pielemeier, supra note 7, at 64–65, 68. 
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traditional lex loci delicti rule,215 which essentially mirrors Rome II’s 
place-of-harm rule.216 
Therefore, in resolving conflicts of laws, some U.S. states have moved 
one step beyond the Restatement (Second) rule because, like the tradi-
tional lex loci delicti rule, it does not adequately reflect important policy 
considerations in defamation cases.217 Among these considerations is that 
permitting a plaintiff to bring a suit in any forum where she has been 
harmed leads to forum shopping.218 Some U.S. courts instead apply a 
more flexible choice-of-law analysis that respects the underlying policies 
of each forum’s law, as well as the reasonable expectations of the liti-
gants.219 While this approach is not without criticism220 and also has been 
applied imperfectly,221 it does reflect a decision by some U.S. judges to 
give substantial weight to the policy implications that occur when local 
law is applied to publishers located outside of a given forum.222 Further-
more, the American approach places greater emphasis on the relationship 
between the publisher and the forum, whereas the prevailing approach of 
foreign courts focuses more heavily on the rights of the party affected by 
a defamatory statement.223 
Professor Pielemeier has also described a “floor effect” in U.S. choice 
of law for defamation claims, whereby “courts should not apply to the 
entire claim any state’s law that is more speech-inhibiting than that of a 
                                                                                                             
 215. SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 117–18. 
 216. See Kunke, supra note 25, 1752–53. 
 217. Pielemeier, supra note 7, at 67–68. However, like most foreign courts, U.S. courts 
tend to automatically apply the law of the plaintiff’s domicile without regard to the un-
derlying policies involved in the choice-of-law determination. Id. at 116. 
 218. Id. at 67–68. 
219. Id. at 68–69. 
Unlike [the territorialist] approach, Professor Currie argued that courts should 
explicitly consider the content and underlying policies of the arguably applica-
ble laws, and inquire “into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the 
respective states to assert an interest in the application of those policies.” 
Stripped to its basics, Professor Currie’s approach provides that if, after such an 
inquiry, the court finds that only one state has an interest in the application of 
its laws (characterized today as a “false conflict”), the court should apply the 
law of that state. If the court determines that more than one state has such an in-
terest (characterized today as a “true conflict”), the court should reconsider. 
Id. U.S. state courts that have adopted this approach include New York, California, and 
Pennsylvania. Id. at 69–84. 
 220. Id. at 69. 
 221. Id. at 103. 
 222. Id. at 77–78. 
 223. Di Bari, supra note 87, at 131. 
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state with a relatively significant interest in compensating the plain-
tiff.”224 As has been shown, one of the strongest critiques of international 
defamation case law is that the imposition of foreign law against Ameri-
can publishers undermines the First Amendment.225 While it is not sur-
prising that courts outside of the United States are unconstrained by U.S. 
constitutional law in rendering verdicts, the fact that American courts at 
least weigh such constitutional interests stands in stark contrast to the 
prevailing approach among foreign jurisdictions.  
A strict application of Brainerd Currie’s interests analysis, however, 
would usually lead to results that mirror the status quo, in that the court 
would apply the law of the forum.226 The typical scenario in an interna-
tional defamation case amounts to a “true conflict”: the two states each 
have a competing and legitimate policy interest, with forum law seeking 
to protect the plaintiff’s reputation and U.S. law seeking to protect pub-
lishers’ free speech interest.227 Under Currie’s rule-selecting process, true 
conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the forum,228 which is 
an identical outcome in most international defamation cases. However, 
this reflects Currie’s belief that true conflicts are best resolved through 
legislative means,229 and has been greatly criticized.230 This should not 
lead us to reject Currie’s analysis. Instead, we should focus on the fun-
damental and revolutionary principle that Professor Currie espoused, 
namely that choice-of-law systems should reflect the substantive policy 
considerations in a given conflict. 
In terms of an objective approach to Rome II’s defamation provision, 
the most important analysis is to fully appreciate the way in which na-
tional interests are furthered or undermined by the application of domes-
tic law to foreign publishers. In particular, the cases in Part II.B show 
that foreign courts routinely undermine U.S. policy interests by applying 
overly permissive choice-of-law rules to modern defamation claims. 
From an American perspective, the greatest harm is that applying foreign 
                                                                                                             
 224. Pielemeier, supra note 7, at 109. 
 225. Sutton, supra note 16, at 419–20. 
 226. See Gary Chan Kok Yew, Internet Defamation and Choice of Law in Dow Jones 
& Company Inc. v. Gutnick, 2003 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 483, 496–98 (2003) (arguing 
that, as applied to the Gutnick scenario, Currie’s rule of applying the law of the forum to 
true conflicts does not provide a more workable framework than the status quo). 
 227. Id. 
 228. SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 116 (citing Brainerd Currie’s interests analysis). 
 229. Id. at 182–83 (noting that “in Currie’s view, a judge is neither constitutionally 
empowered nor otherwise qualified to weigh conflicting state interests”).  
 230. Id. at 183. See also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law 
Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 938 (1975) (noting that “legal order” is an over-
riding concern in conflicts scenarios).  
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law to U.S. publishers undermines the well-established First Amendment 
guarantees that protect our marketplace of ideas.231 While American 
courts have long held that the press should be shielded from onerous 
defamation laws,232 that protection is severely weakened when a plaintiff 
can merely choose to bring a defamation claim in a forum where the like-
lihood of success is far greater.  
That is not to suggest that foreign courts currently ignore policy impli-
cations altogether when exercising jurisdiction over a foreign publisher. 
Rather, the cases in Part II.B show that courts consider foremost the right 
of a plaintiff to bring a claim against a publisher wherever her reputation 
was harmed. But courts do not fully appreciate the broader effects of that 
decision, which includes forum shopping, nuisance suits, and uncer-
tainty.233 Also, publishers must now become knowledgeable about every 
defamation law from abroad, which will in time become unduly prohibi-
tive.234 
If publishers continue to incur costly lawsuits under a place-of-harm 
rule—either under Fiona Shevill’s status quo framework or under Rome 
II—this trend will lead to a chilling effect on Internet publishing as pub-
lishers are continually exposed to defamation claims from foreign courts 
under foreign laws.235 The very real danger is that publishers will limit 
online access in jurisdictions perceived as lacking free-speech guarantees 
or that regularly impose undue liability.236 Cases such as Bangoura show 
that a publisher’s only recourse, assuming that it wishes to avoid univer-
sal liability, is to limit access via the Internet.237 While this remedy ap-
pears to satisfy both the publisher’s and the forum state’s interests, “vir-
tual borders” around a publisher’s online presence threaten to destroy the 
                                                                                                             
 231. Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market”) with Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 
C.L.R. 575, 650–51 (Callinan, J., concurring) (noting that the “marketplace of ideas” 
concept has not “escaped criticism in the United States” and that “Australian law places 
real value on reputation, and views with skepticism claims that it unduly inhibits freedom 
of discourse”). 
 232. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974). 
 233. Vick & MacPherson, supra note 13, at 962–68. 
 234. With decreased sales of print publications, supra note 4, the publishing industry 
can likely ill-afford such litigation. 
 235. “[I]f adopted, the [place-of-harm rule] will create judicial insecurity, promote 
judicial forum-shopping, and, in the end, lead to self-censorship by the media. This chill-
ing effect would be extended to any publication, especially on the Internet.”  European 
Digital Rights, Rome II: Applicable Law and Freedom of Expression (June 29, 2005), 
available at http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3.13/RomeII. 
 236. Wimmer, supra note 38, at 6. 
 237. Supra Part II.B. 
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functioning of the Internet.238 Additionally, jurisdictional avoidance will 
impact those citizens who most greatly need access to online publications 
from abroad, because repressive regimes also tend to restrict free expres-
sion by the press.239 
On a fundamental level, limiting access and self-censorship are “re-
pugnant” to the profoundly American principles of disseminating infor-
mation and ideas.240 While newspapers certainly have a duty to refrain 
from publishing defamatory statements, the access that citizens now en-
joy will likely be curtailed if courts continue to impose national defama-
tion laws on publications operating on the Internet without restraint. This 
should give policymakers great pause, since access to the press is vital to 
the health of global democracy.241 Indeed, the United States has long 
held that “liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion 
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”242 These 
aspirations are in danger when international courts refuse to acknowl-
edge the harm caused by exercising jurisdiction over foreign publishers. 
It is for these reasons that Rome II’s drafters should consider including 
a policy-analysis approach to the choice-of-law rule for defamation 
                                                                                                             
 238. Supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 239. Wimmer, supra note 38, at 6 (citing Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L.REV. 
323, 333–35 (2005)). See also Simon Montlake, China Reins in Reach of Foreign News, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2006, at 6 (“China’s official news agency Xin-
hua issued a new set of directives [limiting distribution of foreign news reports that] ‘un-
dermine national unity’ or disrupt ‘economic and social order,’ among other catch-all 
categories . . . .”). 
 240. Wendy Tannenbaum, Questions of Internet Jurisdiction Spin Web of Confusion 
for Online Publishers, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW at 33 (The Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, Winter 2003) available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/27-
1/lib-interjur.html (citing Editorial, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2002, at A24). 
 241. As Justice Brennan held: 
[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression 
and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to 
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. Im-
plicit in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but also the antecedent as-
sumption that valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be 
informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that process of 
communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solici-
tude not only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable condi-
tions of meaningful communication. 
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–87. (1980) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (citations and emphasis omitted). 
 242. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)). 
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claims. The European Parliament’s proposed place-of-publication rule 
reflected such considerations due to the intense lobbying of the press, but 
this amounted to an a priori preference for publishers over plaintiffs. 
This approach is contrasted with the more flexible conflict resolution 
mechanism that requires judges to examine whether imposing domestic 
defamation law would undermine the policy and national interests of an-
other nation. A more flexible approach would be more assured of pas-
sage by the European Commission and European Parliament, since the 
interests of both publishers and plaintiffs would be considered in each 
particular case. 
While such an approach might be antithetical to the European prefer-
ence for black-letter laws, Brainerd Currie’s revolutionary interests 
analysis has steadily gained acceptance in the United States and abroad. 
Given that foreign courts are routinely adjudicating defamation claims in 
ways that undermine U.S. constitutional free speech concerns—and what 
greater and clearer policy interest could a state possibly have that a con-
stitutional interest?—Rome II’s choice-of-law rule should consider con-
flicting policy interests, either at either the a priori stage or in the adjudi-
cation of individual claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note has explored Rome II’s place within the broader scope of 
transnational defamation law. As demonstrated by the European Union’s 
difficulty in formulating a rule that would satisfy both defamation plain-
tiffs and the press, international defamation law is facing a large-scale 
conflict between reputational and free-press interests. One possible solu-
tion is for the European Union to adopt a rule that includes an American-
style interests analysis as well as the adoption of the single publication 
rule. Such an approach provides a framework to weigh the governmental 
interests of other states, seeks to minimize forum shopping, and is more 
honest about whether applying domestic law might undermine the laws 
of another nation. 
From the perspective of the American press and practitioners, the 
status quo is troubling. Unless there is a meaningful effort to reform ju-
risdictional rules, we can expect to see publishers adopt jurisdictional 
avoidance as a means to avoid liability abroad. The failure of Rome II’s 
defamation provision shows that reform requires a concerted effort by 
American academics, policymakers, and the press to show the profound 
harm that occurs when foreign courts apply domestic laws to U.S. pub-
lishers. On a broader level, we can hope that our American experiment 
with free speech gains further traction abroad. Some of this movement 
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has already occurred through reforms by national courts.243 As the world 
continues to realize the wisdom of limiting defamation laws in order to 
protect the free press, the conflict between national laws will likely di-
minish. As a result, choice-of-law agreements like Rome II will become 
achievable. Until then, the landscape continues to be “a dismal 
swamp.”244 
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